

Q1 Name

Short Text

Q2 Email address

Email

Q3 Phone number

Telephone

Q4 What is your interest in the review? (select one)

Multi Choice

Other, please describe: I am in an apartment building impacted by the flood but my residence wasn't flooded

Q5 Address of the flooded property

Short Text

Q6 Property type

Multi Choice

Q7 Is this your usual place of residence?

Multi Choice

Q8 Did you have to move out as a result of the flood?

Multi Choice

Q9 Are you still living elsewhere?

Multi Choice

Q10 Do you intend to return?

Multi Choice

Q11 What is your business name?

Short Text

Q12 What does your business do?

Short Text

Q13 Did you have to close your business as a result of the flood?

Multi Choice

Q14 Have you been able to reopen your business yet?

Multi Choice

Q15 Do you intend to reopen your business?

Multi Choice

Q16 Do you own the property?

Multi Choice

Q17 Do you intended to sell the property?

Multi Choice

Q18 Your submission

Long Text

Submission for October 2022 Flood Review

1. Our experience:

- Thursday evening (13 October) bedtime there was no indication that such a large amount of water was on its way downstream to Kensington (at the bottom of [REDACTED] where we live) and that we should act.

- It was only because I woke up early on Friday am, 14 October, that I saw the river had risen beyond all predictions and was in the process of breaking its banks.

- We had acted on Thursday with an abundance of caution to evacuate our expensive belongings and that is the only reason we didn't lose anything valuable.

- The water height predictions in advance of 14 October were grossly lower than what actually happened leaving a lot of people lulled into a false sense of security.

- On the morning of 14 October, people stood around on the Stockroute walking path and on the large speed bump on Hobsons Road which is designed to be the one safe egress route for the residents of the [REDACTED] apartment building. Their lack of urgency to act in the face of rising water was alarming and I wonder that there were no emergency personnel of any kind present to encourage people to act not just gawk - especially given the following.

- The flood waters came well up the sides of the Hobsons Road berm/escape route. They also blocked Smithfield Road and the Stockroute walking path. Flood waters did come up as high as The Crescent but I don't know if Speakman Street at The Crescent/Gatehouse Drive was also blocked. If it was blocked, I am uncertain if there was another walking route out for the several hundred residents at the bottom of [REDACTED]. How close did this area come to being trapped and how much worse would the rain event and ground saturation need to be for this group of buildings to be cut off? I don't know the answer to this but given climate change, I think it's reasonable to expect that we're going to have to plan for such an event happening within the near future.

2. Modelling and water gauge data:

- [REDACTED] said during the second online session that "Models are run at least every 6 hours during a major flood event." I am curious, how often were they run during the hours of the 13th leading into the 14th of October? Things seem to have changed very quickly but the Vic Emergency app alerts (from memory) didn't seem to change with the same speed. Evacuation alerts on the app came late and Hobsons Road never received an evacuation alert so businesses and residents along it lost a lot in terms of cars and equipment. Should not the real-time data from the upstream river gauges have been sufficiently alarming to have prompted a greater sense of urgency or earlier alerts and warnings to be issued? And why wasn't an alert sent out for Hobsons Road and Kensington Road which frequently get quite a bit of water accumulation with lots of rain and therefore should have been on the radar as an area to receive advanced warning?

- On 14 October I learned about the BoM website with pages tracking various sites along the Maribymong. The day after I discovered Melbourne Water's webpage with water gauge data and charts. If alerts won't be sent out in future and people will be expected to fend for themselves, it would be quite useful to make these sites known to the public in general and people in flood areas in particular so they can have information on which to base their Stay/Go decisions.

- Further about the BoM's website & water level data, do they have their own water level gauges along the Maribymong and feeder systems or does the information come from Melbourne Water? If the later, will the communication of this data into their system (and presumably thereafter their modelling) be examined? The reason is because in the hours and days after the morning of 14 October, their charts were not consistently updated. If these gauges are Melbourne Water's, were there in fact any interruptions that kept necessary real-time data from the people and services who needed it? And if yes, what needs to change to prevent that happening again?

3. Flood walls:

- Though the Metro Tunnel flood wall and future flood walls are not included in this, should that not change? And if not now then when given the new train rail entrance flood wall and what the consequences might be for Kensington residents and businesses caught between it and the Flemington Racecourse wall?

- As for the Flemington Racecourse flood wall, how could it not have had a significant impact on the flooding in Kensington? That amount of area could have held quite a lot of water and mitigated at least some of the impact on Kensington residents and businesses. In my opinion, the flood wall should be removed with only a small wall around the stables to protect the horses from being caught up in flood waters. The VRC makes plenty enough money off racing and gambling to afford repairing any damage the course might sustain in the event of a flood. Kensington residents put up with the insanity of race days (excessive traffic on major and minor roads like Hobsons Road, the noise and pollution of helicopters hovering multiple times a day to video the races, the increase in drunken foot traffic at the end of race days, etc); we shouldn't also have to sacrifice our homes for the sake of their race tracks.

4. Flood waters and local services:

- While the focus is on water and not on the alerts, I am concerned about the intersection of the flood waters and other local services, particularly electricity. Jemena shut down power to a significant portion of Kensington because, I understand, of a couple of power transformers/boxes located within areas affected by the water. Obviously, Jemena is responsible for that equipment and its management however, was there sufficient warning to Jemena that the water would be reaching that high necessitating shutting power off to so many residences? And, therefore, was there sufficient warning given to the affected residents so they could make the necessary preparations? There would have been people with medical equipment (oxygen, cpap, etc) or manoeuvrability equipment like chair lifts who would have been affected, possibly stranded and unable to escape because of this.

5. When will flood alerts be reviewed?

- If not through this review, when will the issuing of alerts (to whom, how quickly, their accuracy, etc) be reviewed so that necessary improvements can be made and implemented before we get another of these rain events.

Q19 **If you have any supporting documents upload them here.**

File Upload