Q1	**Name**	
Short Text	██████████	

Q2	**Email address**
Email	███████████████

Q3	**Phone number**
Telephone	████████

Q4	**What is your interest in the review? (select one)**
Multi Choice	Other, please describe ████████████████████████████████ ██████████████████

Q5	**Address of the flooded property**
Short Text	

Q6	**Property type**
Multi Choice	

Q7	**Is this your usual place of residence?**
Multi Choice	

Q8	**Did you have to move out as a result of the flood?**
Multi Choice	

Q9	**Are you still living elsewhere?**
Multi Choice	

Q10	**Do you intend to return?**
Multi Choice	

Q11	**What is your business name?**
Short Text	

Q12	**What does your business do?**
Short Text	

Q13	**Did you have to close your business as a result of the flood?**
Multi Choice	

Q14	**Have you been able to reopen your business yet?**
Multi Choice	

Q15	**Do you intend to reopen your business?**
Multi Choice	

THE **HIVE**

Q16

Multi Choice

Do you own the property?

Q17

Multi Choice

Do you intended to sell the property?

Q18

Long Text

Your submission

Flood management has become a crucial issue for the Australian Government and local communities, with millions of dollars spent annually on flood mitigation and recovery efforts. Despite these efforts, there are still inadequacies in flood management that must be addressed.

One of the most significant inadequacies in Mar byrnong flood management was the lack of effective early warning systems. The first flood watch for Melbourne was issued on 11 October. It warned that significant flooding was likely in some Victorian catchments later that week, including the Mar byrnong River. A Watch and Act alert was issued two days before the flood. According to ███████████, Melbourne Water modelling was forecasting major flood levels at Maribyrnong on October 11 and 12. But, the day before the flood (13 October), the water authority downgraded its warning and predicted only a moderate flood. Surely it is the role of BOM and Melbourne Water to take a precautionary approach and err on the side of caution and give people as much warning as possible. People would rather receive an early warning and unnecessarily over-prepare rather than little notice and under-prepare. As pointed out by former Victoria Police commissione ██████ "There is little value in a perfect forecast that is delivered after it is too late to initiate damage-reducing actions.". Instead, at 8.24 PM the night before the disaster, a warning was issued predicting a moderate flood peak of 2.4 meters. That was upgraded when an emergency major flood warning was issued online at 2.25 AM, with an expected peak above 2.9 meters at Maribyrnong. In fact, the river peaked 1.8 meters higher than predicted the previous night.

The delayed and inaccurate warnings come as a surprise. According to the 'Report on Flood Mitigation in the Mar byrnong River Basin: a Preliminary Hydrological Study, by MMBW in 1976, the findings and conclusion stated that 'Significant damage and inconvenience start to occur in the urban areas along the lower reaches of the river when the discharge in the river at Keilor exceeds 350 c.m.s. The extent of damage and inconvenience increases rapidly as the discharge at Keilor exceeds 500 c.m.s.' According to Melbourne Water's publicly available rainfall and flow data, flow rates exceeded 500 c.m.s on 12 and 13 October. Given the saturated catchment, the increase in impervious surfaces since 1974, and the impacts of climate change on hydrological cycles, one would think that the models would be more conservative (not less than) the 1974 calculations. I think it would be a useful exercise to highlight the differences in used models since 1974 so that the community can be assured that FIDSS is the most efficient and reliable flood warning system.

I also find it intriguing that clubs such as the Essendon Rowing Club on the Mar byrnong River, where we held our community event on Wednesday, 12 October, were not aware of the flood risk and were hence unable to communicate this risk with local stakeholders. On 12 October, over 50 participants from the Maribyrnong catchment attended the forum focused on protecting the Maribyrnong River. The group (the Maribyrnong River and Waterways Association) has a strong interest in the Maribyrnong River, and rivers and creeks in the upper catchment, so it was surprising that no one from the event predicted the flood, or raised serious concerns about the poss bility of a flood. This highlights the genuine need for greater flood literacy so that all affected locals know which cues to look out for and have some understanding of flow rates, rainfall levels, and flood risks in the area.

Interestingly, one of the participants was an apology, unable to attend the forum stating, 'I can't make it today as it has started to rain and I am trying to prepare my house for heavy rain tomorrow as last Friday (7 October) I was nearly flooded.' ███ sufficiently sandbagged her property which did not flood on 14 October; however, she spent a few days helping to clean a friend's house, saying 'I did spend yesterday helping a friend clean her mother's house near the Angler's Tavern. The family have owned the house for 90 years, and it is very high off the ground (the oldies knew a thing or two), but water still got in but not as high up as some people.' ███ house nearly flooded on 7 October. I suspect others in the area would have flooded too. Could the experiences (and river data) of individuals like ███ be used to strengthen models and provide real-time data to improve Melbourne Water's flood models?

Overall, there needs to be greater clarity and transparency with how Melbourne Water and BOM model floods in the Maribyrnong Catchment. This information needs to be shared with the community so that locals are flood-literate and know which signals to watch out for when it comes to flood risk.

Q19

File Upload

If you have any supporting documents upload them here.